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LAFCO: IS IT IN CONTROL OF
SPECIAL DISTRICTS?
The growth of metropolitan areas in the United States over the
past 30 years1 is a matter of common knowledge. A rather common
appendage of this growth has been the use of the special district form
of government in an effort to solve some of the problems this growth
has generated.2 Consequently, as metropolitan areas and population
have grown, the number of special districts has grown. This increase
in the number of special districts has generated certain inherent prob-
lems: the overlap of special district boundaries, uneconomic use of lo-
cal resources, inefficiency in local government, increases in taxes, and
the problems of administration caused by the tremendous numbers
alone.3
The proliferation of special districts is demonstrated by the fact
that there are presently 81,248 units of local government in the United
States,4 and of these 21,264 are special districts, an increase of 6,840
since 1957 when there were 14,424 such units. 5 California presents
a microcosm of the national situation, as there are more special dis-
tricts in California than in any state except Illinois.' California has five
to six times as many special districts as it has cities.7  This enormous
number of special districts was brought about as a result of the volumi-
nous growth of California's population following World War H18
1. U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPU-
LATION AND HOUSING, GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR METROPOuTAN AREAs,
1960 to 1970, PHC (2)-1, at 3 (1971).
2. See J. BOLLENS, SPECuL Disucr GovERNmEN THE UNIrED STATES 48-52
(1961) [hereinafter cited as BOLLENS].
3. See notes 31-33 & accompanying text infra.
4. U.S. BtmxAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF Gov-
ERNMENTs, FNANCES OF SPECIL DisTicTs, Vol. 4, No. 2, at 1 (1967).
5. id. at 1.
6. INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, BERKELEY, CAL., SPECIAL Dis-
TRICTS OR SPECIAL DYNASIES? DEMOCRACY DENIED 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL DYNASTIES].
7. Id. See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 2, where the author states that there are
thirty-five states, including California, which have more special districts than any
other class of government.
8. Comment, New Control Over Municipal Formation and Annexation, 4
SANTA CLARA LAW. 125 (1964). That the rapid expansion of California has resulted in
the proliferation of special districts in this state is demonstrated by a comparison of the
total number of special districts existent in California in different years. At the end
of fiscal year 1955-56, for example, there were no less than 2,780 special districts
in the state of California. The figures for fiscal year 1962-63 show a total of 3,342.
In an effort to deal with the problems presented by the prolifera-
tion of special districts, and in order to bring about orderly growth
and development in local areas, the California Legislature, in 1963, es-
tablished a Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) in each
county,9 and in 1965, enacted the District Reorganization Act of
1965,10 which increased the responsibility of LAFCO to control the
proliferation of special districts in California.1' The purpose of this
note is to illustrate the cause for the extended use of the special district
in California and the resulting problems encountered. Furthermore,
the attempts of the California Legislature to rectify the problem through
the establishment of LAFCO and the enactment of the District Reorgani-
zation Act of 1965 will be discussed. Finally, some suggestions will
be made as to ways in which LAFCO can better be structured to ac-
complish its intended tasks with suggested guidelines to that end. This
note will only deal with LAFCO's relation to special districts, as op-
posed to its broad grant of authority to deal with the development of
local agencies in general. 12
The Use of the Special District in California
A special district is a form of governing body which has been used
to help solve the problems of metropolitan life.' 3 Special districts are a
unique form of local government. 14  One of the key characteristics of
special districts, which sets them apart from other forms of local govern-
ment, is their limited function. 15 Also, special districts, unlike other
types of local government, often have overlapping territorial boundaries.' 6
Furthermore, the inhabitants of a special district may participate in its af-
fairs or elections on the basis of property ownership.'" Although this
These figures indicate a growth of 562 special districts in a period of just seven years;
an average of approximately 80 new districts per year. See R. LEGATES, CALIFORNIA
LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION CoMMissioNs 52 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LEGATES].
9. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1808, § 1, at 3658, as amended, CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 54780 (West Supp. 1971).
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE §H 56000-550 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
11. See LEGATES, supra note 8, at 48.
12. The general powers and duties of LAFCO are set forth in CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 54790 (West Supp. 1971).
13. See Brooks, The Metropolis, Home Rule, and the Special District, 11 HASINGS
L.J. 110, 112-15 (1959). See generally Tobin, The Legal and Governmental Status of
the Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129 (1958).
14. See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 1-3, 247-49.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 248.
17. Id. at 249-50. Thus, residents who own no property within the district
may be entirely precluded from participation. On the other hand, nonresidents who
own property within the district may be eligible to participate, and, in some instances,
voting rights are directly proportional to the amount of land owned. Id.
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characteristic is not common to all special districts, it is one not found
in most cities or towns.' Another significant charcteristic is the sep-
arate financial status of special districts.19 Although they have a far
more restricted revenue base than other types of local government, 20
they are not usually subject to the constitutional debt limitations placed
on cities and counties.2 These characteristics differentiate special dis-
tricts from other forms of local governments.
These characteristics of special districts have a crucial bearing on
the purposes for which they are often used. Special districts are mainly
created to perform one or a very limited number of functions or ac-
tivities, 22 usually a specific function in a restricted geographic area.23
For example, when there are too few people in a rural area to in-
corporate into a city or town, the special district provides a useful
method by which a needed municipal service can be rendered for the
area.
24
In addition, special districts are often used to solve a problem or
provide a needed service when the existing local government is unable
or unwilling to do so. The unwillingness of a local government to
provide the service may be because of political or administrative atti-
tudes that the service is unnecessary or undesirableY.2  Also, the local
government may be unable to provide the service because of statutory
or constitutional limitations, 26 or it may be easier for the state to estab-
18. Id. at 250. Bollens points out that the primary use of property as a condi-
tion for participation in nondistrict government is for the elections pertaining to some
local bond issues. Id.
19. Id. at 42.
20. This restricted base is usually confined to the levy of a service charge for
the service performed, or the levy of a service charge combined with a property tax. Id.
21. See id. at 7-8, 118-20. For a discussion of the California position see F.
STARNER, GENERAL OBLIGATION BoND :FINANCING By LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1, 26
(1961) [hereinafter cited as STARNER].
22. BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 247-49.
23. Interview with Mr. J. S. Connery, Administrative Analyst, Office of the
County Administrator, Contra Costa County, Sept. 30, 1971. Mr. Connery is also the
Executive Officer of the LAFCO of Contra Costa County. A special gratitude is due
to him for his time and perceptive and revealing comments regarding LAFCO.
[hereinafter cited as INTERviEw]. See also BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 5-7.
24. Interview, supra note 23. See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 5-7.
25. Comment, Voter Restrictions in Special Districts: A Case Study of the Salt
River Project, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 636, 639 [hereinafter cited as Voter Restric-
tions]. See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 7-10.
26. See Makielski, The Special District Problem in Virginia, 55 VA. L. REv.
1182, 1187 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Makielskil; Rafalko, Overlapping Districts
Versus Municipal Authorities in the Area of Urban Redevelopment, 3 SAN DEGo L.
REv. 24, 29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rafalko]; Constitutional Restrictions Upon
Municipal Indebtedness, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 462, 478 [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Restrictions]; Note, Special Districts and Deficient Local Government in the Salt Lake
Metropolitan Area, 7 UTAH L. Ruv. 209 (1960).
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lish a special district than for the existing local government to act.2
An important limitation on the ability of an existing city or county
to solve a problem is found when states limit, either in their constitu-
tions28 or their statutes,"9 the indebtedness which these local govern-
ments may incur.30 Special districts have been created in an effort to
circumvent these debt limitations and to provide a needed service which
the existing municipality is unable to provide. "' This is because the
special district may have a debt limitation separate and distinct from
that of a city with which it may be coterminous.3 2
Although the purposes for which special districts may be used
are basically laudable, their use as a problem-solving device has pre-
sented problems. They have been criticized as performing only stop-gap
measures and providing no long-run, effective solution for problems
presented at the local level.33  The over-utilization of the special dis-
trict has resulted in "overlap, duplication, waste and inefficiency. '31
The proliferation of special districts has also resulted in an increased
tax burden on the people within their boundaries. 5 In addition, spe-
cial districts often "provide short-sighted and inefficient government" '36
simply because their functions are often not coordinated with adjoining
or overlapping districts.3 7  They have failed to lend themselves to pro-
moting any general scheme of local government. Rather, it appears
they have caused a piecemeal approach to local government formation,
leading to inefficiency and duplication of effort.38
27. Voter Restrictions, supra note 25, at 639.
28. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 40.
29. E.g.. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 29909 (West 1968) (limitations on counties);
id. § 43605 (West 1966) (limitations on cities).
30. See generally Rafalko, supra note 26, at 29-33.
31. See Makielski, supra note 26, at 1187; Voter Restrictions, supra note 25, at
639; cf. Tobin, The Metropolitan Special District: Intercounty Metropolitan Govern-
ment of Tomorrow, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 335 (1960); Constitutional Restrictions,
supra note 26, at 478.
32. See Makielski, supra note 26, at 1187; Constitutional Restrictions, supra
note 26, at 478.
33. See Hankerson, Special Governmental Districts, 35 TEx. L. REv. 1004,
1007-09 (1957); Makielski, supra note 26, at 1194-96.
34. Meeting of the Assembly Interim Committee on Municipal and County
Government, Transcript of Hearing, On the Subject "Uniform Consolidation, Dissolu-
tion and Withdrawal Procedures for Special Districts" 4 (Jan. 16, 1964) quoting
former California Governor Brown [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hearings]; see id. at 1.
35. See Hankerson, Special Governmental Districts, 35 TEx. L. Rv. 1004, 1005
(1957). See note 63 infra.
36. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 7.
37. See id.
38. See Report of the Executive Officer to the Local Agency Formation Com-
mission of Alameda County on "Dissolution of the Eden Township County Water
District." Although this district was dissolved by the LAFCO, its existence dem-
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The argument has also been advanced that special districts pro-
vide an undemocratic form of local government.3 9 Usually, only their
board members are elected, and more often than in other forms of lo-
cal government, the incumbents run unopposed. 40  In many situations,
no official is actually chosen by the electorate. 4 ' The charge that spe-
cial districts do not provide a democratic form of local government is
significant when one considers that one of the fundamental principles of
local government "is its representative, democratic nature. ' 42 The
statement has been made that special districts are unresponsive to the
people they are created to serve, and that they are "an intolerable anom-
aly in today's sensitively democratic society."'43
Special districts have also been criticized because of their invul-
nerability to public control.44 This is caused in part because of public
apathy. The proliferation of the special district has created a state of
indifference; people cannot focus their attentions on so many units and
a lack of control over special districts results.4"
These negative aspects of special districts indicate the problems
that are presented by their unrestricted, uncontrolled use. There is no
justification for several different special districts operating within the
same geographic area resulting in a duplication of effort and a waste of
local resources. Despite any advantages that may be offered by the use
of a special district as a problem-solving device, their proliferation has
generally been found to present an intolerable problem of inefficiency,
waste and overlap in local government.40
One of the reasons for the extensive use of special districts in Cali-
fornia47 has been to circumvent the constitutional and statutory debt
limitations placed upon cities and counties in the state.4" Under the
California Constitution, no city or county is permitted to incur any in-
onstrates the inefficiency and duplication of effort which can occur with the unin-
hibited use of the special district. The primary function of the district was to pro-
vide conservation of ground water, but other districts in the area which performed a
water service and/or water conservation function included: Alameda County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and
the City of Hayward.
39. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 6. See SPECIAL DYNAsrI=s, supra note 6, at iii,
1-4, 15-21; BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 248-50.
40. BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 248-50.
41. Id.
42. SPECIAL DYNAsTEs, supra note 6, at iii.
43. Id. at 2.
44. BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 252-56.
45. Id.
46. See 1964 Hearings, supra note 34, at 4, 21, 45.
47. See note 8 supra.
48. See STARNER, supra note 21, at 1, 3, 26; J. ViEG, CALIFoRNIA LOCAL FINANCE
230-31 (1960) [hereinafter cited as VIEG].
debtedness which exceeds in any year the income which will be pro-
vided in that year without first gaining the approval of two-thirds of
the electorate.4 9 Special districts are not subject to this constitutional
restriction.5" Most of the laws that establish special districts require
a two-thirds voter approval of indebtedness, 5 ' but there are many oth-
ers which require only a simple majority. -5 2  Hence, in numerous situa-
tions a special district can be created to finance a project or provide a
needed service where a city or county might be unable to act.
A second limitation, encouraging the use of special districts, placed
on the indebtedness of cities and counties is found in the California
Government Code. 3 The code limits the ability of a city to incur in-
debtedness for improvements to "15 percent of the assessed value of all
real and personal property of the city."5  The code limits the amount
of bonded indebtedness of a county to "5 percent of the taxable prop-
erty of the county as shown by the equalized assessment roll." 55  Spe-
cial districts are not subject to these limitations: on the contrary, they
are only subject to the debt limitations established for them in their en-
49. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 40. The constitution specifically states: "No
county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, shall incur any
indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the
qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose, nor unless
before or at the time of incurring such indebtedness provision shall be made for the
collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it
falls due, and also provision to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the prin-
cipal thereof, on or before maturity, which shall not exceed forty years from the time
of contracting the same; provided, however, anything to the contrary herein notwith-
standing, when two or more propositions for incurring any indebtedness or liability are
submitted at the same election, the votes cast for and against each proposition shall be
counted separately, and when two-thirds of the qualified electors, voting on any one of
such propositions, vote in favor thereof, such proposal shall be deemed adopted."
50. STARNER, supra note 21, at 1, 26.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 3, 26.
53. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 29909 (West 1968); id. § 43605 (West 1966).
54. Id. § 43605 (West 1966). The section provides: "A city shall not incur
an indebtedness for public improvements which exceeds in the aggregate 15 percent of
the assessed value of all real and personal property of the city. Within the meaning
of this section 'indebtedness' means bonded indebtedness of the city payable from the
proceeds of taxes levied upon taxable property in the city."
55. Id. § 29909 (West 1968). The section specifically states: "The total
amount of bonded indebtedness shall not at any time exceed 5 percent of the taxable
property of the county as shown by the last equalized assessment roll. If water con-
servation, flood control, irrigation, reclamation, or drainage works, improvements, or
purposes or the construction of select county roads is included in any proposition
submitted, the total amount of bonded indebtedness may exceed 5 percent but shall not
exceed 15 percent of the taxable property of the county as shown by the last equalized
assessment roll."
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abling legislation.56 These limitations on the indebtedness of cities
and counties have served as an incentive for the creation of special
districts to provide needed services, when the services could have been
provided by the city or county in the absence of the debt limitations.57
This growth of special districts has, in turn, resulted in the growth
of the many problems commonly associated with a large number of
special districts.
The Creation of LAFCO
The Knox-Nisbet Act
In an effort to control the use of the special district58 and to insure
the "orderly formation and development of local governmental agen-
cies,"59 the California Legislature passed the Knox-Nisbet Act 0 in 1965.
This act amended the 1963 legislation which created the Local Agency
Formation Commissions (LAFCO) and provided:
Among the purposes of a local agency formation commission are
the discouragement of urban sprawl and the encouragement of the
orderly formation and development of local governmental agencies
based upon local conditions and circumstances. 61
This language, though it applies to all local agencies, such as cities,
counties, towns, and special districts, is an implied recognition of the
problems created by the uninhibited growth of independent special dis-
tricts.
This attempt by California "to rationalize the proliferation of lo-
cal governments was without precedent in the nation"' 62 and in its final
form was the result of a compromise between various factions within
56. See, e.g., CAL. HEAILTH & S. CODE § 24370 (West 1967); CAL. PUB. UTM.
CODE § 12842 (West 1965).
57. VrEG, supra note 48, at 230-31.
58. See LEGATES, supra note 8, at 48.
59. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54774 (West Supp. 1971).
60. Id. §§ 54773-799.2 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
61. Id. at § 54774 (West Supp. 1971). The California District Court of Appeal
in City of Ceres v. City of Modesto, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 79 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969),
specifically stated that this was the purpose of LAFCO. The court said: "It is immi-
nently clear, from a careful reading of section 54774, that LAFCO was created by the
Legislature for a special purpose, i.e., to discourage urban sprawl and to encourage the
orderly formation and development of local government agencies. In short, LAFCO
is the 'watchdog' the Legislature established to guard against the wasteful duplication
of services that results from indiscriminate formation of new local agencies or haphaz-
ard annexation of territory to existing local agencies." Id. at 553, 79 Cal. Rptr. at
172.
62. LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION CommISSIONS, 1966 STATEWIDE SURVEY (Inter-
governmental Council on Urban Growth, 1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 STATEWIDE
SUvEY].
March 19721 LAFCO AND SPECIAL DISTRICTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the state.63 The Governor's Commission on Metropolitan Area Prob-
lems was in favor of a powerful statewide commission which would
have the final approval of all boundary changes, incorporations of cit-
ies, annexation of territory into cities, formation of special districts and
the like.64 The opposite extreme of this position was presented by the
County Supervisors Association of California, which favored a commis-
sion with advisory powers only.6 5 The ensuing legislative compromise
resulted in the establishment of a LAFCO in each county of Califor-
nia.6° At the present time, there are 57 commissions in operation
under the Knox-Nisbet Act in California, San Francisco County being
the only county without a LAFCO. 67
The District Reorganization Act of 1965
The District Reorganization Act of 196568 was enacted by the
legislature in an attempt to deal specifically with the proliferation of
special districts.69 The act provides procedures to be followed when-
ever a special district undergoes a change in organization,"0 which is
defined to include any annexation or detachment of territory to or from
a district, any merger of one district with another, the consolidation of
two districts into one, and the dissolution of any district.71 It also pro-
vides the procedures to be followed when there is a district reorganiza-
tion7 2 which includes a change of organization which is proposed for
each of two or more districts. 73  This act adds to the authority of
LAFCO by empowering the commission to deal with special districts
regarding matters other than their formation. While the Knox-Nisbet
Act amended the act which created LAFCOs, the DRA established a
uniform procedure to be followed for change of organization, reor-
ganization, consolidation, and dissolution of special districts4 and pro-
63. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 15-18. See J. GOLDBACH, BOUNDARY CHANGE IN
CALIFORNIA: LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSIONS 12-15 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as GOLDBACH]; Goldbach, Local Formation Commissions: California's Struggle
Over Municipal Incorporations, 25 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 213, 218-19 (1965).
64. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 16-17.
65. GOLDBACH, supra note 63, at 13; LEGATES, supra note 8, at 15.
66. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54780 (West Supp. 1971). Although the commissions
are located at the county level, and are made up of county and city officials, they are a
state agency. 45 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 82, 84 (1965).
67. See LEGATES, supra note 8, at 21.
68. CAL. GOG'T CODE §§ 56000-550 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
69. See LEGATEs, supra note 8, at 48.
70. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 56001 (West 1966).
71. Id. § 56028 (West Supp. 1971).
72. Id. § 56001 (West 1966).
73. Id. § 56068 (West Supp. 1971).
74. Id. § 56001 (West 1966).
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vided that LAFCO would supervise and dispose of any proceedings
brought in accordance with its provisions .7 5
The Operation of LAFCO
As previously discussed LAFCOs operate under the statutory au-
thority granted by two acts of the state legislature-the Knox-Nisbet
Act76 and the District Reorganization Act77 of 1965. The former
amended the legislation which created the LAFCOs and empowered
them to deal with the growth and development of local agencies and
areas.78  The latter empowered the LAFCOs to deal with the prolifer-
ation of special districts.7 9
Specifically the Knox-Nisbet Act grants LAFCO the powers to
carry out its purpose of encouraging the orderly growth and develop-
ment of local governmental agencies. 0  Under this act the LAFCOs
are given the power to approve or disapprove:81 the incorporation of
cities;82 the formation of special districts;83 the annexation of territory
to cities, special districts and other local agencies; s4 the exclusion of
territories from cities;8s the disincorporation of cities;86 and the develop-
ment of new communities within their jurisdiction.87 The commissions
also may adopt their own standards for the evaluation of any proposals
submitted to them.8 8 In addition, they may establish rules pertaining
to the conduct of their hearings, expend funds necessary for perform-
ing their functions, employ staff personal, and contract for professional
services to help them carry out their functions.s9 Moreover, the com-
missions have the power to review the boundaries of any territory in-
volved in any proposals before them and to waive certain restrictions of
other parts of the code if they find the restrictions would be detrimen-
tal to the orderly and rational development of the community. 90
In granting LAFCOs additional powers in order to deal with spe-
cial districts, the District Reorganization Act empowers the commis-
75. See id. § 56033.
76. Id. §§ 54773-799.2 (West 1966), as amended (West Supp. 1971).
77. Id. §§ 56000-550.
78. See note 61 supra.
79. See LEGATEs, supra note 8, at 48.
80. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54790 (West Supp. 1971).
81. Id. § 54790(a).
82. Id. § 54790(a)(1).
83. Id. § 54790(a)(2).
84. Id. § 54790(a) (3).
85. Id. § 54790(a)(4).
86. Id. § 54790(a)(5).
87. Id. § 54790(a)(6).
88. Id. § 54790(b).
89. Id. § 54790(c)-(e).
90. Id. § 54790(f), (g).
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sion to approve or disapprove: proposals for changes in organization; 9'
proposals for reorganization which are not required to be reviewed by
a reorganization committee;92 and reports on recommendations of the
reorganization committee." The commissions must determine if the
proposals, reports, or recommendations of the committee are in accord
with specific or general plans of the county or cities.9" The commis-
sion may approve or disapprove any proposals, recommendations, or re-
ports conditionally or unconditionally.9 5
In both the Knox-Nisbet Act and the District Reorganization Act
the power to initiate96 proceedings for proposals for formation, reor-
ganization, incorporation, or dissolution is not granted to LAFCOs.
Legislation was proposed to grant the commissions the power to initiate
proposals but was never passed.9" Under the District Reorganization
Act, the initiation of proposals to dissolve a district must be made by
either a petition of landowner-voters, 98 a petition of resident-voters, "9
or resolution of a county, city, or district legislative body.100 The com-
mission can then set a hearing for the proposal, after which it makes a
resolution of determinations.10' After the commission makes its deter-
minations, and if it approves the petition or resolution for a dissolution,
the county board of supervisors then adopts a resolution in compliance
with the determination, initiating proceedings for a dissolution. 10 2 Un-
der the present legislation, the commission must wait for a petition or
resolution before it can eliminate an inefficient district.
Before the board of supervisors orders a dissolution of a district, in
compliance with the commission's resolution of determinations, 10 3 it
must make one of the following findings:
91. Id. § 56250(a)(1) (West 1966).
92. Id. § 56250(a)(2). A reorganization committee is composed of "a mem-
ber of the legislative body . .. and an officer or employee" of each district which is
being considered for a reorganization. Id. § 56223. Members of the public may
serve on the committee if LAFCO appoints them. Id. § 56232. The reorganization
committee makes a study of and a report and recommendation on any proposal for a
reorganization which LAFCO refers to it. Id. §H 56215, 56234.
93. Id. § 56250(a)(3).
94. See id.
95. Id. § 56250.
96. The code defines "initiate" as follows: " 'Initiate' or 'initiation' means, in the
case of proceedings, the first procedural step authorized or required by any law for
the commencement of such proceedings...." Id. § 54775(g) (West Supp. 1971).
97. GOLDBACH, supra note 63, at 111. "The formation commission cannot initiate
a proceeding [under the District Reorganization Act of 1965]." REviEw OF SELECTED
1965 CODE LEGISLATION 141 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed., 1965).
98. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 56130 (West 1966); id. § 56183 (West Supp. 1971).
99. Id. § 56130 (West 1966); id. § 56173 (West Supp. 1971).
100. Id. § 56195 (West 1966).
101. Id. § 56270 (West Supp. 1971).
102. Id. § 56360 (West 1966).
103. Id. § 56292 (West Supp. 1971).
[Vol. 23THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(a) That there has been a nonuser of corporate powers ....
and a reasonable probability that such nonuser may continue.
(b) That the dissolution of the district will be for the interest of
landowners or present or future inhabitants within such district or
both.
(c) That the district is a resident-voter district and is unin-
habited.' 04
If the board makes findings under subsections (a) or (c) above,
it may dissolve the district with or without a vote of the electors. °0 If
the board rests its determination solely on the ground that dissolution
"will be for the interest of landowners or present or future inhabitants
within such district," 10 6 then such dissolution is subject to a confirma-
tion by the voters.' 0 7 With the requirement of voter confirmation of
a dissolution, LAFCO becomes involved in the political realities of
convincing the voters that dissolution of a district is for their best in-
terests.10 8 This presents a serious obstacle to LAFCO's ability to dis-
solve a district because it is often difficult for the commission to dem-
onstrate in concrete, absolute terms that dissolution is necessary.10 9
If a district is inefficient, it is frequently difficult, if not impossible, for
the commission to prove that consolidation or dissolution will indeed
bring about a greater efficiency with reduced cost to the public.,]' 0
These factors help to explain the obstacle that voter confirmation places
upon the ability of LAFCOs to bring about orderly growth in the com-
munity.
The Powers of LAFCO Should Be Expanded
In order to determine whether present legislation is sufficient, a
brief review of the effectiveness of LAFCOs in carrying out their pur-
pose of encouraging the orderly growth and development of special dis-
tricts is necessary. At the end of fiscal year 1963-64, the year when
LAFCO was created, there were 3,317 special districts in California."'1
At the end of fiscal year 1968-69, there were 3,442 special districts in
California."12  This shows a growth of only 125 special districts in a
period of five years. In fact, during the first year of the commis-
104. Id. § 56367.
105. Id. § 56368.
106. Id. § 56367.
107. Id. § 56368.
108. Interview, supra note 23.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 52.
112. OFicE OF TE STATE CONTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT OF FINANCIA TRANSAC-
TIONS CONCERNING SPECIAL Dis=crs OF CALIFORNIA (OTHER THAN UT-LmrS), FisCAL
YEAR 1968-1969, at 3.
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sions' operations, just seventeen new districts were approved-com-
pared to 186 new districts established in 1963,113 prior to the forma-
tion of LAFCO. Some of the LAFCOs have also helped to reduce the
"patchwork effect" of districts and other agencies "by requiring, when-
ever feasible, that the boundaries of newly formed districts coincide with
those of existing districts."' 4
There is another benefit from LAFCOs which is not found in the
statistics; many district formation proposals are not brought before the
LAFCOs when such proposals are of a questionable nature.' This is
probably true because "LAFCOs appear to be less receptive to proposals
for the formation of new special districts than to any other kinds of pro-
posals concerning local agencies."' 16  Moreover, the fact that LAFCO
decisions do not appear to be appealable to any other administrative
body'1 7 further increases the effectiveness of the commissions.
California courts have been hesitant to interfere with the agencies'
decisions. In effect, they have ruled that the commissions are po-
litical bodies and so have sustained their actions where chal-
lenged.' 18
Therefore, LAFCO decisions are generally final."'
113. GOLDBACH, supra note 63, at 44.
114. 6 FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MUNICIPAL
AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT 55 (1963-1965).
115. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 50.
116. LEGATES, supra note 9, at 50; see GOLDBACH, supra note 63, at 87-88.
117. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 21.
118. GOLDBACH, supra note 63, at 47.
119. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 21. In fact, there have been only two California
appellate court cases that did review LAFCO determinations: City of Ceres v. City of
Modesto, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 79 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969), and San Mateo County
Harbor Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 273 Cal. App. 2d 165, 77 Cal. Rptr. 871
(1969). The decisions in both of these cases demonstrate that the courts have neither
limited the powers of LAFCO nor allowed review of LAFCO decisions except in
special or unusual circumstances. In Ceres, the LAFCO attempted to establish the
future boundaries for the city of Ceres. The court held that it could not set future
boundaries as this would be beyond its authority. The court held that LAFCO
had only those powers expressly granted to it by statute, and the power to establish
future boundaries being not granted to it in the statute, LAFCO could not establish
them. In regard to this the court specifically said: "A local agency formation com-
mission, commonly referred to as LAFCO is a creature of the Legislature and has
only those express (or necessarily implied) powers which are specifically granted to
it by statute. In short, LAFCO is a public entity created by legislative fiat, and
like similarly constituted public entities is a body of special and limited jurisdiction.
.. 274 Cal. App. 2d at 550, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
In Harbor District, LAFCO did not make its own determinations of the facts
and attempted to delegate this authority to the board of supervisors of the county.
The court held that the LAFCO must make its own determinations and that it could
not delegate its authority. Both of these cases clearly support the conclusion that
LAFCO decisions will be reviewed only on rare occasions, such as attempts by the
LAFCOs to go considerably beyond their express statutory grant of authority.
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Although the performance of the LAFCOs to date appears to
have been relatively successful in curbing special district prolifera-
tion,120 there is need for improvement. In view of the inefficiency and
duplication of effort caused by the continued increase in the number of
various local agencies, 121 and also by the unnecessary continuation of
many existing agencies, 22 the rate of increase of special districts in
California should be halted or even reversed. At the present time,
however, the LAFCOs lack sufficient power to effectively deal with the
mounting problem.
Although LAFCO has been somewhat effective in diminishing the
growth rate of special districts in California, 2 3 it is presently unable to
solve the problem of existing districts. LAFCO is presently hampered
in two ways: first, it is unable to initiate proposals for dissolution
24
which, in effect, forces it to remain passive and immobile until a peti-
tion for dissolution is brought before it; and more importantly, LAFCO
cannot dissolve a district when it believes it would be for the best in-
terest of future or present inhabitants without a confirmation of the
voters located within the district.'Y5 If the problems presented by the
sheer number of special districts in California are ever to be effectively
treated, each of these limitations on the ability of LAFCO to act must
be corrected by'legislative action.
The legislature should give LAFCO the power to initiate pro-
posals for dissolution of a district under the District Reorganization Act.
It should also increase LAFCO's power by eliminating the requirement
for voter confirmation when the district is sought to be dissolved for
the benefit of the landowners or residents. 12 6  These additions would
greatly increase LAFCO's ability to carry out its legislative purpose. 2 7
Concurrent with this additional grant of power to LAFCOs, the
legislature should mandate guidelines for the commissions to follow with
respect to the dissolution of special districts. Although there are pres-
ently guidelines stated by the legislature for general application, 2 1 other
guidelines should be specifically tailored for the dissolution of special
120. See text accompanying notes 111-117 supra.
121. See BOLLENS, supra note 2, at 250-56; 1964 Hearings, supra note 34, at 2-5.
122. See Letter from Mr. J. S. Connery to Mr. H. V. Worthington of May 12,
1971.
123. Compare note 8 supra with text accompanying notes 111-116 supra.
124. The code defines "dissolution" to mean "the dissolution, disincorporation,
extinguishment and termination of the existence of a district and the cessation of
all its corporate powers, except for the purposes of winding up the affairs of said
district." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 56038 (West 1966).
125. See text accompanying notes 106-09 supra.
126. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 56368 (West Supp. 1971).
127. See notes 58-61 & accompanying text supra.
128. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 54796 (West Supp. 1971).
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districts which the commission determines should be dissolved for the
benefit of the landowners or residents within the district. An extension
of the powers of LAFCO, as proposed, would be ineffective unless cer-
tain guidelines imposing a mandatory duty on the agency to dissolve
anachronistic, inefficient special districts were also promulgated. These
guidelines, along with the additional powers, should change the nature
of LAFCO from that of a passive to an active organization intent on
seeking out special districts with no useful purpose, and eliminating
them or combining them with other districts to prevent providing dupli-
cation of services.
Guidelines To Be Followed
Present Criteria
At present, the Knox-Nisbet Act 129 establishes certain guidelines
for the LAFCOs to follow in carrying out their functions. These guide-
lines are as follows:
Factors to be considered in the review of a proposal shall include
but not be limited to: (a) Population, population density; land
area and land use; per capita assessed valuation; topography, nat-
ural boundaries, and drainage basins; proximity to other populated
areas; the likelihood of significant growth in the area, and in adja-
cent incorporated and unincorporated areas, during the next 10
years.
(b) Need for organized community services; the present cost
and adequacy of governmental services and controls in the area;
probable future needs for such services and controls; probable ef-
fect of the proposed incorporation, formation, annexation, or ex-
clusion and of alternative courses of action on the cost and ade-
quacy of services and controls in the area and adjacent areas.
(c) The effect of the proposed action and of alternative ac-
tions, on adjacent areas, on mutual social and economic interests
and on the local governmental structure of the county.
(d) The definiteness and certainty of the boundaries of the terri-
tory, the nonconformance of proposed boundaries with lines of
assessment or ownership, the creation of islands or corridors of un-
incorporated territory, and other similar matters affecting the pro-
posed boundaries.
(e) Conformity with appropriate city or county general and spe-
cific plans.130
These guidelines are substantial, and set forth the factors LAFCOs
should consider whenever a proposal is before them. They do not,
however, as a close reading reveals, require any affirmative action
on the part of LAFCO, nor do they deal specifically with the dissolution
of special districts.
129. Id. §§ 54773-799.2 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
130. Id. § 54796 (West Supp. 1971).
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Guidelines, however, are provided for the dissolution of special
districts under the District Reorganization Act' 3 ' in the sense that the
board of supervisors must make one of three findings before it orders
the dissolution of a special district.' 32 These guidelines can be basi-
cally stated as: a nonuser of corporate powers on the part of the dis-
trict to be dissolved, that the district is a resident-voter district and
there are no residents within its boundaries, that dissolution would be
for the benefit of landowners or future or present residents.1 33  Again,
however, these guidelines require no affirmative action on the part of
the LAFCOs. They do not provide specificity with respect to the prob-
lems which proliferation of special districts can cause. The "nonuser"
and "lack-of-resident" guidelines provide useful tools for dissolution of
districts which are either inactive, as in the case of a district dissolved
under the nonuser provision, or unnecessary, as in the case of a resi-
dent-voter district with no residents. Although the final guidelines for
dissolution-the benefit of landowners or residents-is general, it has
more flexibility than the other two.
Recommended Additional Guidelines
In addition to the guidelines applicable to the function of
LAFCO generally, the commissions need more specific guidelines
to follow should they be granted the additional powers as previously
proposed. First, LAFCO should be required by the legislature to ac-
tively study the special districts in the county to determine which ones
should be dissolved. Under this affirmative power and duty, it should
investigate whether or not there is a waste of local resources because
more than one special district is attempting to solve the same or simi-
lar problems. Furthermore, it should question whether there is in-
efficiency in local government as a result of too many special districts
in the county even though the districts might be performing different
functions.' 34 As a part of this active study, the commission should be
required to determine whether the existence of the districts is placing
too great a tax burden on the people in the county, and if so, to seek
methods of eliminating some of the districts. If the commission finds
any or all of the above problems during its survey, and it determines
that the districts involved cannot be consolidated or somehow changed
131. Id. §§ 56000-550 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
132. See text & accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
133. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 56367 (West Supp. 1971).
134. The commission might possibly eliminate this inefficiency, if one is found
to exist, by creating a large multifunctional district to handle the services and problems
the existing districts are handling. For a good discussion of multifunctional districts
see Tobin, The Metropolitan Special District: Intercounty Metropolitan Government
of Tomorrow, 14 U. MIumI L. REv. 333 (1960); Tobin, The Legal and Governmental
Status of the Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIuffI L. Rv. 129 (1958).
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so as to alleviate the problems, the commision should be required to
initiate a proposal to dissolve them.
Second, the LAFCOs then should be required to hold hearings
on dissolution. These hearings would provide a forum for the persons
opposing the projected dissolutions and enable LAFCO to maximize
the information available before its final decision. Without such a
forum, special hardships that might ensue if the district were dissolved
may be inequitably overlooked.
Third, with the problems defined and determined by LAFCO,
there should be a presumption that the district should be dissolved un-
less the particular district's proponents can demonstrate at the public
hearing a further need for the district. Considering the purpose of
LAFCO and the problems caused by the proliferation of special dis-
tricts, LAFCO could better perform its functions if the burden of proof
was placed on those wanting to keep the district. If the presumption is
not overcome by the people within the district or those who favor its
retention, then LAFCO should be required to make a resolution of
determinations that the special district(s) involved be dissolved.
In conjunction with these guidelines, the Knox-Nisbet Act and the
District Reorganization Act should provide that mandamus proceed-
ings be available against the LAFCOs by a citizen should the commis-
sions refuse to act. Mandamus is presently available and may be is-
sued by a court "to compel the performance of an act which the law
specially enjoins.""' Although it is normally available to a private citi-
zen only when the citizen has some special interest to be preserved or
some special right to be protected,' 36 mandamus is also available to a
private citizen when it is the object of the writ to procure performance
of a public duty and a public right is involved. 3 7
LAFCO should be mandated by the legislature to perform its
functions, and a procedure should be available for people to insure
that it carries out its purposes. The availability of a mandamus against
it for failure to act would provide that insurance. Finally, these proce-
dures under the proposed additional grants of power should be reviewed
by the courts only to determine if LAFCO has exceeded its statutory
135. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085 (West 1955); Cooper v. Estero Municipal
Improvement Dist., 70 Cal. 2d 645, 650, 451 P.2d 417, 420, 75 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780
(1969).
136. Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water Dist., 242 Cal. App. 2d
52, 56, 51 Cal. Rptr. 120, 124 (1966).
137. E.g., Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 829, 377 P.2d 83, 86, 27 Cal. Rptr.
19, 22 (1962); Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 357, 196 P.2d 562, 566 (1948);
Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 811, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1969);
Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 643, 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365
(1963).
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grant of authority. 38 This would appear to be a sufficient safeguard
to an abuse of power by any of the commissions under the proposed
guidelines.
Conclusion
The special district form of government has been extensively used
throughout the nation, and in particular in California, 139 as a problem-
solving device. It has been used at times for laudable, necessary pur-
poses, and at other times as a method of circumventing constitutional
and statutory debt limitations placed upon municipalities and counties.
This proliferation of special districts has resulted in inefficiency, waste,
and duplication of effort. This extensive use of the special district has
resulted in problems which are more serious than those it was created
to solve.
One of the primary reasons for the creation of LAFCO was to con-
trol the proliferation of independent special districts in California.140
Yet, there are more independent special districts in California at present
than there were at the end of the first year of LAFCO's operation.'41
This is true despite the enactment of the District Reorganization Act of
1965 which was designed to provide stricter control over special dis-
tricts. This continued proliferation of special districts is a result of in-
sufficient powers granted to LAFCO rather than poor performance on
its part. This insufficiency of the powers of LAFCO can be eliminated
in two ways.
First, LAFCOs would be far more effective organizations if they
were given the power to initiate proceedings and proposals under the
Knox-Nisbet Act and the District Reorganization Act of 1965. This
can be accomplished 4- by an amendment to those two acts granting
the LAFCOs this additional power. Then the LAFCOs could make
studies and initiate proceedings without having to convince others that
a dissolution would be beneficial.
Second, the requirement in California Government Code section
56368 for a confirmation of the voters when a district is dissolved for
the benefit of the future or present inhabitants should be removed
from the act. LAFCO should be given the final decision-making power
138. See note 119 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
140. LEGATES, supra note 8, at 48.
141. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
142. The legislature has the power to grant these additional powers to LAFCO.
There is not any constitutional barrier, federal or state, impeding its action. The au-
thority is vested solely in the legislature, and this body should exercise it and grant
these needed additional powers to LAFCO. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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in this area. Any objection that the commission might not consider the
desires of the people is overcome by the fact that a majority of the
members of the commissions are elected members of the community. 143
The voters could demonstrate their displeasure with LAFCO actions
at election time.
If the legislature should grant these additional powers, the com-
mission should be mandated to take an active role in special district
dissolution. To properly supervise this grant of power the legislature
should expand LAFCO's guidelines to include those proposed in this
note. 144  To revise LAFCOs powers without these specific affirmative
guidelines from the legislature will not insure the correction of the
problem and would thus defeat the legislative purpose.
D. Wayne Jeffries*
143. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54780 (West Supp. 1971) (Majority of its members
are appointed from the county board of supervisors and city officer positions).
144. See text accompanying notes 131-38 supra.
* Member, Second Year Class
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